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Abstract
Traditional techniques to prevent damage from ran-
somware attacks are to detect and block attacks by
monitoring the known behaviors such as frequent name
changes, recurring access to cryptographic libraries and
exchange keys with remote servers. Unfortunately, in-
telligent ransomware can easily bypass these techniques.
Another prevention technique is to recover from the
backup copy when a file is infected with ransomware.
However, the data backup technique requires extra stor-
age space and can be removed with ransomware. In this
paper, we propose to implement an access control mech-
anism on a disk drive, called a KEY-SSD disk drive.
KEY-SSD is the data store and the last barrier to data
protection. Unauthorized applications will not be able
to read file data even if they bypass the file system de-
fense, thus denying the block request without knowing
the disk’s registered block key and completely elimi-
nating the possibility of the file becoming hostage to
ransomware. We have prototyped KEY-SSD and vali-
dated the usefulness of KEY-SSD by demonstrating (i)
selective block access control, (ii) unauthorized data ac-
cess blocking and (iii) negligible performance overhead.
Our comprehensive evaluation of KEY-SSD for various
workloads show the KEY-SSD performance is hardly de-
graded due to OS lightweight key transmission and ac-
cess control drive optimization. We also confirmed that
KEY-SSD successfully protects the files in the actual
ransomware sample.
1 Introduction
Ransomware is a type of malware that encrypts data files
of a victim computer and requires the victim to pay a
ransom to regain file access. Very recently, in June 2017,
more than 12,000 computers were attacked worldwide by
ransomware including those of at least 80 large compa-
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†Y. Kim is a corresponding author.
nies [15]. Only a month before, a similar massive ran-
somware attack happened [15]. According to a recent
report [14, 21], it is estimated that $200 million were
paid for ransomware only in the first quarter of 2016.
Since ransomware incurs immediate financial damages,
it is one of the growing concerns in information security.
A typical ransomware attack reads and encrypts files and
takes encrypted files as hostages. These attacks can be
performed through the normal file I/O path of the OS or
by bypassing the OS directly in the user application.
The techniques to detect and prevent ransomware has
been researched and developed, but it can not be perfect
as ransomware evolves. Ransomware can be detected by
monitoring the behavior of applications (potential ran-
somware) in the operating system, network, or file sys-
tem [36, 29, 45, 28, 1, 7, 2, 11]. For example, if an
application exhibits frequent renaming, frequent access
to cryptographic library, and communicating with known
malicious servers, it is considered as ransomware. How-
ever, if adversaries are aware of these techniques, they
may manage to develop a new type of ransomware that
does not exhibit the behaviors recognized by these tech-
niques. Another way to mitigate ransomware is to back
up data. If a file is infected by ransomware, version con-
trol systems can be used to track the history of a file
and recover it. However, maintaining backup copies of
files requires additional storage and may incur the perfor-
mance overhead on host computers and network traffic.
Furthermore, there is a risk of intelligent ransomware de-
stroying backup files [44, 13].
To address the problems of these existing techniques,
we present a fundamental solution of ransomware that
is not based on signature-based behavioral monitoring
(which can be circumvented by intelligent ransomware)
and does not cause excessive storage or performance
overhead. In this paper, we present KEY-SSD, an
access-control drive to protect the files from ransomware
attacks. KEY-SSD can shield aforementioned attacks
through I/O paths to the disk drive. Our primary contri-
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bution is that KEY-SSD implements a disk-level access-
control mechanism where unauthorized requests are de-
nied by a disk drive. Even if ransomware bypasses the
traditional access-control mechanism in the file system
by exploiting the vulnerabilities of applications, it cannot
bypass the disk-level access-control mechanism. Unau-
thorized ransomware cannot even read a file data on the
disk drive, and consequently, cannot take files hostage.
Traditional SSDs are block-devices that do not have ca-
pability of granting or denying read/write requests. On
the other hand, KEY-SSD controls block-level access to
block-level read/write requests, thereby blocking unau-
thorized data read/write access. Object storage [12] in-
cludes an object-level access-control mechanism. Since
it adopts a higher level of abstraction, it requires a signif-
icant modification to the system software to take advan-
tage of it. But, KEY-SSD requires only minimal modi-
fication of existing system software because it maintains
the traditional abstraction level.
While traditional access-control mechanisms are im-
plemented in a file system and control access to files, our
focus is on controlling access to blocks by a disk drive.
Modern SSDs use low-power and multi-core controllers
to provide significant computing performance [41, 10,
17, 32, 6, 38]. For KEY-SSD, we implemented the ac-
cess control mechanism using these powerful computa-
tion resources on the disk drive. Specifically, the disk-
level access control mechanism is implemented in the
flash translation layer (FTL) on the SSD. Blocks in any
file that need protection from Ransomware attacks can
be assigned an access code (key) from the application.
The FTL of an SSD determines whether to grant access
to each block while retaining key information per block.
Since the key must be delivered to disk through the OS
kernel, it is necessary to modify the OS, but it is crucial
to implement it with little performance degradation.
We conducted a comprehensive evaluation for KEY-
SSD by implementing the LBA-key map table in Linux
kernel while keeping the existing SATA protocols with
real commodity SSD and the Jasmine OpenSSD plat-
form [40]. We compared the performance of KEY-SSD
with a variety of file I/O patterns using a mix of syn-
thetic and realistic workloads. Specifically, in our eval-
uation with both real SSD and Jasmine OpenSSD plat-
form, we observed that KEY-SSD yields negligible over-
head compared to a baseline with normal SSDs without
the access-control mechanism. We have also verified that
KEY-SSD can block unauthorized ransomware I/O ac-
cess by running actual ransomware code.
2 Background
2.1 Threat Model: Ransomware Attacks
The primary target of ransomware is data files created by
a user through an application (e.g. Word processor). As
will be discussed in more detail in Section 5.6, typical
ransomware goes through infection, persistence, remov-
ing backup copies, encryption, and notice. Specifically,
we consider that ransomware may exhibit following be-
haviors.
• While encrypting a user file, ransomware may over-
write it or create a new file after deleting the original
file. Though file deletion only removes the metadata
that keeps data blocks in the disk, the data blocks may
be overwritten by other write operations. Thus, we
consider both cases to ensure no data loss.
• Ransomware may access files through a regular file
system or directly access the raw disk drive without
going through the file system. Traditional access-
control mechanisms are implemented in the file sys-
tem. If ransomware bypasses the file system, there is
no more barrier in the disk drive. Since the proposed
access-control mechanism is implemented in the disk
drive, it can also prevent direct access attacks.
• Ransomware may be a user-level application with a
root privilege. Ransomware can acquire a root privi-
lege by exploiting vulnerabilities in applications or op-
erating system. Once it has a root privilege, it can ac-
cess files of other users. The proposed technique can
defend files against this type of ransomware.
• Ransomware may hijack system calls, but cannot ac-
cess kernel data structures in file system layers. Sys-
tem call hijacking is one of the most popular tech-
niques to implement a rootkit (kernel-level malware).
A system call may be replaced by a malicious one.
However, it is assumed that kernel data structures can-
not be tampered because it requires recompilation of
the kernel, which is more challenging than hijacking.
2.2 Access Control in Disk Drive
Data files created by a user cannot be restored unless they
have backup copies. Loss of data incurs not only finan-
cial damages but also interruption of operations. In 2015,
a zero-day ransomware, WannaCry, attacked computers
in more than 150 countries, and caused U.K. National
Health Service hospitals and Honda Motor Company to
shut down [8]. This catastrophic damage implies that ex-
isting countermeasures were not effective. The applica-
tion may protect data files by a password or encryption,
but a password and encryption are intended to protect
contents of a file from being revealed, not a file itself.
Thus, ransomware is still able to read and encrypt the
file, though the ransomware may not interpret the con-
tents of the file.
The proposed approach is to integrate an access-
control mechanism with a disk drive. The access-control
mechanism allows access to files under protection only
for authorized applications. This access-control mech-
anism specifically targets at preventing ransomware. In
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fact, this access-control mechanism can be implemented
in the file system. But, Compared to file system imple-
mentation, disk-level implementation has the following
advantages.
Security: Since a disk drive is a separate system from
a host, it is not easy to compromise both host and disk
drive at the same time. Especially, if the disk drive does
not allow firmware update by the host, it is very diffi-
cult to compromise the disk drive unless the disk drive is
physically accessible.
Compatibility: The implementation of the disk-level
access-control mechanism is independent of a file sys-
tem. To support KEY-SSD, an additional kernel mod-
ule needs to be inserted to the file system, but it does not
change any structures in the file system. Therefore, KEY-
SSD can be adopted without changing the file system.
3 KEY-SSD: Access Control Drive
3.1 Goals
In this section, we discuss our key design principles.
Selective Disk-level Block Access Control: Data
blocks must be given an access key to grant access to
the data block. This access control must be implemented
within the disk drive. Not all data blocks need to be pro-
tected with an access key. The user/application should be
able to specify data blocks of the files to be protected, and
the data blocks must be selectively protected by the ac-
cess key according to the user’s request. It is also neces-
sary to minimize the performance and space overhead of
managing the key per block in the disk drive. In addition,
the cost of keeping this information persistent should be
minimized.
Key Transmission in OS: Since the disk drive con-
trols the block-level key access, the OS must be able to
transfer the key corresponding to the block to the disk
drive. Also, data blocks of the protected files and their
corresponding keys must be transferred to the disk drive
at the same time. There is a possibility for ransomware
to access the disk without a key if data block and key
transfer occur separately.
Minimal OS support for KEY-SSD: Ransomware
can attack through normal file I/O paths in OS or by-
passing the OS file system to access file data directly. In
order to differ normal file I/O requests and direct I/O re-
quests, the OS must be able to assign the keys only to the
block requests of normal file I/O operations. In addition,
most OS speed up disk access through the file system
page cache. Because the page cache does not require
disk access, malicious attacks can not only read data us-
ing cached data, but also delete files without accessing
disk data. To protect against attacks using data in the
page cache, an OS level implementation is required. To
this end, OS kernel code modifications should be mini-
mized.
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Figure 1: An overview for KEY-SSD with OS stack.
3.2 KEY-SSD Overview
We envision KEY-SSD to be the last firewall to block
ransomware attacks. Figure 1 presents a bottom-up de-
scription of the system for each component necessarily
implemented at every level of OS stack and device drive.
Access Control Drive: The lowest level is the access-
control drive (KEY-SSD) that is a solid-state drive, ca-
pable of running disk-level access-control. Flash transla-
tion layer (FTL), which is a firmware in the SSD, man-
ages the key per block. To authorize a request, an appli-
cation needs to put a request along with a key. If a key is
sent separately from the request, the key can be exploited
by ransomware by putting a malicious request between
the key and the valid request. Therefore, we guarantee
a request arrives at the disk drive at the same time with
a key by piggy-backing the key with the request in the
SATA protocol.
OS Support for Access Control by KEY-SSD: OS
manages the key and passes the key assigned by the ap-
plication to the access control drive. The key stays in
the OS temporarily. In particular, when a block request
is transmitted to KEY-SSD in a block layer, the type of
block (normal file I/O operation or direct I/O access) can
be distinguished and a key can be assigned accordingly.
Moreover, it also protects against attacks using the OS’s
page cache and deleting files without authentication by
KEY-SSD.
Application Interface Passing Keys to OS: The user
must be able to assign keys to blocks of files to be pro-
tected. Especially, applications need a mechanism to
transfer block keys to OS. In other words, it should not
go beyond the existing system call interface design prin-
ciples and it should be able to pass the file block keys to
the OS when performing I/Os.
Together, these construct to build a last-level protec-
tion against data attacks by malicious applications.
4 Design and Implementation
In this section, we describe the implementation of the
access control mechanism in the SSD and the implemen-
tation in the OS kernel to pass keys from the application
to the KEY-SSD. Specifically, we have implemented a
LBA-key management framework in OS kernel and the
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FTL extension for disk-level access control management
on the SSD with the following main design goals: (i)
efficient implementation of FTL performing disk-level
key management and access control on the SSD, (ii)
lightweight key management in OS kernel, and (iii) no
modification of existing SATA protocol to communicate
between host OS and the SSD.
4.1 Disk-level Access-Control
KEY-SSD implements a disk-level access-control mech-
anism where unauthorized requests are denied by the
disk drive. Access authentication is performed using
such computational resources as an ARM-based, multi-
core storage controller on SSDs. SSD communicates
with a host through various I/O protocols such as SATA
protocol. In this paper, we implemented KEY-SSD for
SATA-based SSD.
KEY-FTL: KEY-SSD can extend the FTL to manage
the key per block, for which we call KEY-FTL. KEY-
FTL can be implemented statically or dynamically, de-
pending on how the key per block is managed in the
SSD’s internal memory. In a static method, a key field
can be added to each mapping table entry to have a
unique key for each disk block. This method, called
KEY-FTL(S) is advantageous in that the implementa-
tion is simple and the key search time for block access
is O(1) because FTL is a linear page-table, as shown
in Figure 2(a). However, the drawback is that a large
memory space is required because blocks of files that do
not need to be protected with a key also require mem-
ory space for the key value. In order to reduce mem-
ory space overhead, we propose a dynamic method of
managing only LPNs protected by keys in the memory
of an SSD (KEY-FTL(D)). In our implementation, this
method used a red-black tree for managing LPNs that
is protected by the corresponding key because the red-
black tree data structure is appropriate for fast searching
of LPNs corresponding to keys. When a block request
arrives with LPNs and key, the key value of the request
is hashed to search for the red-black tree of the corre-
sponding LPNs. The search for LPNs corresponding to
the key is performed.
Access Control Mechanism: A disk drive that re-
ceives a key along with an I/O request from the host per-
forms access control on the data block by comparing its
key value in the KEY-FTL with the key value in the re-
quested block when performing a read/write operation.
When the device receives a write/read command, the
authentication is granted as follows. In case of a write,
when an SSD receives a write request, the SSD firmware
first reads the key from the KEY-FTL and compares it
with the key sent by the host. If the value of a key is
different, it sends an error message back to host without
performing the write operation because it is not authen-
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<WRITE, LPN=0, KEY=0x000033>
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Figure 2: (a) and (b) depictKEY-FTL(S) and KEY-
FTL(D). In (b), K-Node is a pointer to a red-black-
tree for LPNs corresponding to a key, and a node in
the red-black-tree denotes a LPN. (c) shows sequence of
read/write operations with access-codes.
ticated. If the key value is the same as that in the KEY-
FTL, write operation is allowed. Also, the value of the
key field of the KEY-FTL may be NULL. In this case, it
means that write to the LBA has not yet occurred. There-
fore, in this case, the key value received from the host is
added to the key field and write is performed. Read also
operates the same way as write. But, in read, if the key
field of the LBA referenced in the KEY-FTL is NULL,
the key is not stored and is granted. Figure 2(c) shows the
read write sequence with keys and how a read request
generated by ransomware is denied. Refer to <READ,
LPN=2, KEY=0xFFFFFF> in the sequence. The key
value of LPN=2 is 0x000018 in KEY-FTL(S) in (a).
In particular, the way to access KEY-FTL(D) is di-
vided into insert and search steps. Insert step is to add
a new (key, LPN) to the KEY-FTL(D). When the host
attempts to write to the new page on the SSD with the
key, the corresponding LPN and key are inserted into the
KEY-FTL(D). Search step is used for authentication by
searching the KEY-FTL(D) with (key, LPN). In our im-
plementation, in order to minimize the overhead of se-
quential I/Os for authenticating every access to LPNs,
we only allowed the first LPN access during search step.
Selective Flush for KEY-FTL: KEY-FTL is loaded
into volatile memory in SSD. Sudden power-failures can
cause all KEY-FTL entries in the memory to be lost,
so they need to be synchronized with flash, the perma-
nent storage space. This operation is called flush oper-
ation. The KEY-FTL flush function is called from the
SSD firmware. For the SATA protocol, HOST sends
the command ATA CMD FLUSH and the SSD firmware
calls the KEY-FTL flush function. Calling a flush oper-
ation can affect SSD performance and the performance
overhead is proportional to the size of the mapping ta-
ble. The KEY-FTL additionally manages the key in-
formation and the size of the KEY-FTL is larger than
4
Access 
Control 
Drive
Block Access 
Authentication
(LBA, KeyIn)
Software I/O 
Event Queue
Key-FTL
Key-SSD
User Application
sys_open_key(file, KeyIn)   
sys_close_key(file, KeyIn)   
VFS Layer
Generic Block I/O
SATA Device Driver
KeyInode
KeyLBA
Inode KeyIn
(Inode, KeyIn)
(Inode, LBA)
LBA
(KeyIn, LBA)
OS 
Kernel
read_key(file)   
write_key(file)
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normal FTL. In order to minimize the increased flushing
overhead due to large FTL, we propose a method, called
Selective Flush which flushes only the changed entries
in KEY-FTL, rather than updating all the KEY-FTL en-
tries in batches. This can greatly reduce the overhead of
writing FTL to the flash.
4.2 Block Key Transfer and OS Support
To perform key authentication per block request on a disk
drive, it is essential to transfer the key to the disk drive.
The key corresponding to the LBA requested by the host
must be correctly registered in the KEY-FTL of the KEY-
SSD, and the block access authentication control must be
properly performed. Importantly, the key must be sent
synchronously with the LBA block request. After the
block request is completed, the key must be deleted from
the OS kernel to minimize space overhead.
Key Management in OS: Specifically, the LBA key
must pass through OS kernel including the file system,
generic block layer, and block device driver. LBA keys
must be managed by the OS kernel. We create and man-
age two hash tables – KeyInode table (KEYINODE) and
KeyLBA table (KEYLBA) in the kernel for this purpose.
In the Linux kernel, the information accessed at each
layer is limited. That is, the LBA information of the file
is not known at the VFS layer, but the file inode infor-
mation of the VFS layer can be accessed at the generic
block layer. Therefore, in this study, we implement the
two tables in the kernel. In Linux, each file is represented
by an inode. The KEYINODE table is implemented in
the VFS layer of the kernel and manages the key value
assigned to each file. The KEYLBA manages the key
value assigned to each LBA and is implemented at the
generic block layer in the kernel. The KEYINODE is ref-
erenced by the LBA’s inode at the generic block layer,
and it builds the KEYLBA. When making a request to
the device from the driver, it consults with the KEYLBA
to find the appropriate key to the LBA and send the LBA
and key together at the same time in a request to the de-
vice.
An application has key information for each file. In
order to transfer the key of the file from the appli-
cation to the disk drive, we define the following sys-
tem calls: sys open key(), and sys close key().
Each system call is similar to existing system calls,
sys open() and sys close(). The sys open key()
system call can insert a new key into the KEYINODE
by sending a key from the application to the kernel
when opening the file. The sys close key() sys-
tem call removes dynamically allocated inode-key ele-
ments from KEYINODE when the file is closed. This
makes the kernel free from the threat of hackers be-
cause it does not have the key information of the closed
file. Our specific implementation is as follows: We ex-
tended do sys open kernel function by adding a key
function parameter and name it do sys open key. The
do sys open key function is the first kernel function to
be called when the sys open key system call is called.
It uses file path to fetch file metadata such as inode
from disk, link it to file descriptor, return it, and open
file. In the do sys open key function, we can cre-
ate an element with key and inode values for the file
and insert it to the KEYINODE. We also implemented
close fd key to free the element corresponding to the
current file from the KEYINODE. The close fd key
function is the first kernel function that is called when the
sys close key system call is called, and performs file
close by freeing file metadata mapped to the file descrip-
tor. Note that the file key information is removed from
the kernel by deleting the element from the KEYINODE
when the file closes.
The generic block layer creates a KEYLBA to trans-
fer the keys to the device driver. Each element in
the KEYLBA is created when reading or writing a
block of related files and is deleted after the key
is sent from the device driver (SATA driver) to the
disk drive. Our specific implementation is as fol-
lows: In the generic block layer, the KEYLBA is con-
structed using the make generic request function.
The make generic request function is used to create
an I/O request using the bio structure, which is called
from the generic block layer after the EXT4 file sys-
tem. The bio structure has the inode information of the
corresponding block. Therefore, it is suitable to create
KEYLBA in this layer, and it can refer to the existing
KEYINODE in this function, find the LBA key, and in-
sert the element with LBA and key information together
into the KEYLBA. As we will describe in the next sec-
tion, the elements of the KEYLBA are deleted from the
table after the device driver completes the I/O request
to the device. Figure 3 illustrates the implementation of
KEYINODE and KEYLBA in the OS kernel stack.
The KEYLBA managed by the kernel can protect only
the user data of the file. That is, the key value of
KEYLBA is to protect only the data block defined by
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Figure 4: Illustration of key transmission between host
and KEY-SSD [4]. Word 4 in the Register FIS is used to
deliver the key.
the users. Therefore, in this study, the block type (data
blocks requested through normal file I/O operations and
those requested by directly I/O operations) are distin-
guished in the block layer. At the block layer in Linux,
the block accesses are managed by address space
structure of inode. If the block is mapped to the address
space of the inode of its corresponding file, it means
block requests from normal file I/O operations. Keys are
assigned accordingly by consulting with KEYLBA. Else
if the block is mapped to the address space of the unique
inode within the block device structure, it is block re-
quests by direct I/O operations, thus keys are not as-
signed to those blocks.
Secure key management is orthogonal to the proposed
approach. In this paper, we assume the key of user data
is managed by the application. To enhance key security,
we may consider using a remote authentication server or
Trusted Computing Module (TPM) to manage keys for
KEY-SSD.
4.3 Host to Device Communication
The key transferred from the kernel to the SATA de-
vice driver is transmitted to the disk drive in compliance
with the SATA protocol. SATA protocol consists of 5
layers (Application, Command, Transport, Link, Physi-
cal layers). In the Application layer, the host stores the
disk command in the shadow command register. Next,
the Command layer uses the Command Sequence State
Machine to create a frame information structure (FIS)
transfer protocol for transmitting commands of the host.
There are a total of 14 FIS packets in the transport layer
and the FIS used for disk read/write includes Register
FIS and Data FIS. In the Transport layer, the FIS is trans-
mitted in the order specified by the Command layer, and
the corresponding FIS is encoded in the Link layer and
reaches the disk drive through the physical layer. In our
implementation, the key is transferred to the disk using
the transport layer of the SATA protocol. In particular,
we use the reserved space of the Register FIS to transmit
the key.
Figure 4(a) shows the structure of Register FIS. It
consists of five words, but the last word (32 bit) is not
used. Since the Register FIS is transmitted to disk drive
firstly including LBA before data transfer, Register FIS
can transmit the key synchronously with LBA and can
make the key mapping table on the KEY-SSD before
data transfer. In addition, since the key is allocated to
the reserved space of the Register FIS, there is no need
to modify the SATA protocol itself for key transmission.
32-bit access can be vulnerable to brute force attacks (ex-
haustive search). However, KEY-SSD can implement a
mechanism that counts the number of invalid attempts
and rejects these brute force attacks by blocking requests
if the request exceeds a predefined threshold. And if the
SATA protocol is extended, a longer key can be used. As
illustrated in Figure 4(b), the Register FIS is involved at
the beginning and end of the protocol in both write and
read operations and a key is piggybacked in the Register
FIS from the host to KEY-SSD.
4.4 OS Security Issues
Inode protection: In KEY-SSD, only the user data of
the file is protected by the key, and the metadata of the
file is not protected. Therefore, the file open which reads
only the inode of the file can succeed without the file
key. To solve this problem, we propose a read-verify
method. The read-verify method generates a request to
read data directly from the disk and confirms whether the
data can be actually read. That is, it does not read only
the inode of the file when the file is opened, but verifies
that the actual data of the file can be read by using the
read-verify method.
Page cache: Most OS implement disk cache, called
page cache, to improve disk access time. However, page
cache can cause security problems to access files cached
in the page cache without a key. Consider a case where a
process with the correct key reads a file, and another pro-
cess without an valid key or key accesses the file from the
page cache. In particular, a ransomware attack can read
a file’s original data from the page cache, encrypt it, cre-
ate a new file, and delete the original file. To solve this
problem, we have implemented the read-verify method
described as a solution to the inode protection security
problem. Previously, the read system call first checks
whether there is data in the page cache of the file, and
then reads the data from the disk only if it does not exist.
On the other hand, the read-verify method uncondition-
ally reads the first page data of the file from the disk, and
verifies that the data can be actually read from KEY-SSD
when reading the file.
File deletion with invalid key: When deleting a file,
6
LBAcmd size
4RD 8
3WR 12
...... ...
Hardware Event 
Queue (128 cmd)
NCQ
(32 cmd)
HOST
register FIS
(SATA Protocol )
(cmd, LBA, size, key)
Key-SSD Firmware
LBAcmd keysize
4RD 0x0000878
3WR 0x00002312
...... ......
Software Event 
Queue (128 cmd)
Key-
FTL
Figure 5: Software queue implementation for KEY-
SSD.
we used the read-verify method by calling a function that
checks if the data can be read from KEY-SSD. It can not
delete a file without a valid key.
5 Evaluation
In this section, first we show the overhead analysis of
KEY-FTL and the effectiveness of selective flushing of
the KEY-FTL. Second, we analyze the OS kernel over-
head for key transmission to KEY-SSD and the end-to-
end overhead including the OS kernel and KEY-FTL im-
plementation overhead. Third, we perform a step-by-step
analysis of the usefulness of the KEY-SSD for a typical
ransomware attack.
5.1 Experimental Setup
Implementation: In order to prototype the KEY-SSD,
we modified 360 lines of C code in the Linux VFS and
the generic block I/O layers, 180 lines of C code in the
firmware of the Jasmine OpenSSD platform [40]. We
also modified 70 lines of C code in the SATA device
driver. Specifically, KEY-FTL has extended a page-
based FTL with greedy GC on the Jasmine OpenSSD
platform.
Software I/O Event Queue: In the Jasmine OpenSSD
platform, the command in the Register FIS sent through
the SATA protocol is first assigned to the I/O event
queue, which is responsible for queuing commands.
This event queue can accommodate up to 128 I/O com-
mands simultaneously, operating in FIFO mode. Jasmine
OpenSSD platform uses a hardware event queue. In the
hardware event queue, only the command, LBA, and size
are stored automatically in hardware, so there is no way
to store the key here. Therefore, we created a new key
event queue that operates with software and stored com-
mand, LBA, size and key in the queue. Figure 5 illus-
trates the implementation of software event queue for
KEY-SSD.
Test-bed: All experiments were performed on a sin-
gle server with 16 GB of RAM and an Intel (R) Core
(TM) i5-7500 CPU @ 3.40GHz. The operating system
is Linux with kernel 4.10.16. We examined two stor-
age devices that are detailed in Table 1. We selected
the Micron 250GB MLC SSD as a baseline to measure
Linux kernel implementation overhead for KEY-SSD. In
order to include the implementation overhead of internal
SSD Spec Jasmine MX200 SSD
Company Indilinx Crucial Micron
Type MLC MLC
Interface SATA SATA
Capacity 64 GB 250 GB
Read (MB/s) 270 555
Write (MB/s) 90 556
Table 1: SSD Specification. Read and write bandwidth
was measured using I/O Benchmark Suite [31].
FTL and the SATA target driver on the SSD, we modi-
fied the firmware of the Jasmine OpenSSD development
platform [40].
Workloads: We examined the key transmission and
processing overhead on the SSD in terms of I/O band-
width. To measure the overhead of disk-side implemen-
tation, we used an I/O Benchmark Suite, fair-lio [31] that
uses the libaio asynchronous I/O library on Linux [22],
performing reads and writes on raw block devices. We
have also made an in-house multi-process based I/O
benchmark program to evaluate the overhead of Linux
kernel implementations for key transfer and management
in the kernel. To evaluate KEY-SSD, this benchmark
program use sys open key() and sys close key()
to pass keys to the kernel during I/Os. We used two
representative file sizes to have different file groups be-
cause the data center workload consists of many small
files and a few large files [23]. We used 4 KB small
files and 512 MB big files. We also used SQlite [25]
and DBbench [3] for the end-to-end performance anal-
ysis of KEY-SSD for realistic experiments. An actual
ransomware sample is used to show that KEY-SSD can
prevent from both normal file I/O path attack and Direct
I/O attack bypassing file system layers in the OS. In par-
ticular, for every experiment to measure the performance
overhead of kernel and FTL implementations, we did a
page cache flush to rule out the OS page cache effect .
Threat Model: According to our threat model in Sec-
tion 2, a system call may be hijacked. If an applica-
tion sends a plain key to OS, it could be revealed by a
hijacked system call. Since the focus of this paper is
on demonstrating the effectiveness of integration of an
access-control mechanism with a disk drive, we used a
plain key in our current implementation. But, a signature
that is encryption of a hash value of the address and data
of each request can be used instead of the plain key.
5.2 Overhead Analysis of KEY-FTL
In this section, we show the overhead analysis of KEY-
FTL(S) in KEY-SSD versus normal page-based FTL in
SSD. Firstly, we compared the performance of I/O hard-
ware and software queues using the fair-lio I/O bench-
mark suite. We observed that there is negligible per-
formance difference between hardware and our software
queue implementations, but owing to space constraints
here, we do not show results.
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Figure 6: Performance comparisons of KEY-FTL(S) in Key OpenSSD and normal FTL in OpenSSD for write and
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Figure 7: Performance analysis of KEY-FTL(D) by
varying the percentage of blocks locked by keys.
Secondly, we evaluated the disk-level performance
overhead of KEY-FTL(S) for KEY-SSD. We compared
the write and read I/O performance of KEY-SSD with
KEY-FTL, called Key OpenSSD and normal SSD with
normal FTL (with no key), called OpenSSD for a vari-
ety of I/O workload patterns (sequential and random) by
varying I/O queue depth. Figure 6(a)(b) show the re-
sults to compare KEY-SSD with KEY-FTL(S) and nor-
mal SSD for write only workloads. We evaluated the
performance comparison by changing the FTL flushing
methods (all flush (AF) or selective flush (SF)). Note that
all flush means all entries of the mapping table are all
synchronized no matter what entries are changed while
selective flush means only changed entries from the ta-
ble are synchronized. In case of all flush, it is observed
that the throughput of Key OpenSSD is less than 20-30%
of that of OpenSSD. It is because the size of the KEY-
FTL(S) in Key OpenSSD is nine times larger than that
of the normal FTL. A page size in OS is 4 KB whereas
a page size in the Jasmine OpenSSD is 32 KB. Thus, an
entry of FTL has eight key values for each 4 KB page.
However, in case of selective flush, we observe that there
is little difference between Key OpenSSD and OpenSSD
due to small flush overhead.
Figure 6(c)(d) show the results for read only work-
loads. Read workloads rarely flush, so there is little dif-
ference in performance between KEY-SSD and normal
SSDs.
Performance analysis of KEY-FTL(D) and KEY-
FTL(S): In KEY-FTL(D), a key is dynamically allo-
cated. It is advantageous in terms of space compared
to KEY-FTL(S), but the performance of KEY-FTL(D)
will depend on the portion of blocks locked by keys. For
performance evaluation, we partitioned 4GB and mea-
sured direct I/O performance by varying the percentage
of blocks locked among all blocks to 0% (0GB), 25%
(1GB), 50% (2GB), 75% (3GB), and 100% (4GB). We
ran the fair-lio I/O benchmark suite for a variety of I/O
patterns such as sequential read and write and random
read and write by increasing queue depth. 0% means
there is no protected blocks by keys, which is a similar
case to a baseline FTL without keys. On the other hand,
100% means all data blocks are protected by keys.
Figure 7(a) shows the results for reads. We ob-
serve read bandwidth is around 250 MB/s regardless
of the percentage of locked blocks. It means perfor-
mance is almost equivalent to the baseline without keys
and KEY-FTL(S). KEY-FTL(D) has a search overhead
for granting access to the LPNs corresponding to the
key, however, with our results, the search overhead can
be said almost negligible. Figure 7(b) shows the re-
sults for writes. The baseline without keys and KEY-
FTL(S) show very similar performance while KEY-
FTL(D) shows decreased throughputs. This is be-
cause the overhead of inserting key nodes is larger than
the search overhead. In our implementation for KEY-
FTL(D), it is necessary to register the key in KEY-FTL
and lock it for all LPNs of the request sent from the host.
However, these results are for worse case when all LPNs
are for first writes. If they are update-writes on blocks
already locked, it only involves the search overhead of
LPNs for granting access with the key, so performance
will get better.
5.3 Kernel Implementation Overhead
In this experiment, we analyze the kernel implementa-
tion overhead for key transmission and management for
KEY-SSD. The experiments were performed by increas-
ing the number of processes, each generating the same
workload. Figure 8 compares the performance results
of KEY-SSD (Key MicronSSD) with normal SSD (Mi-
cron SSD). This experiment was performed using a Mi-
cron MLC SSD to analyze only the kernel implementa-
tion overhead, excluding the KEY-FTL implementation
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Figure 8: Analysis of the kernel implementation overhead for KEY-SSD with Micron MLC SSD. Small Files and Big
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Figure 9: Analysis of the end-to-end performance experiment including the kernel and firmware implementation
overhead using the Jasmine OpenSSD. The experimental environment is the same as that for Figure 8.
overhead. The SATA driver sends the key in the Register
FIS, but the SSD ignores the key. In particular, in order
to analyze the performance cost of key search in KEYIN-
ODE, we performed two experiments – (i) to delete key
from KEYINODE when closing (Close) the file and (ii)
that does not delete key when closing the files (NoClose).
From Figure 8, we observe the results for small files
show lower throughputs than big files workload. Small
workload performs I/O operations on a large number of
small files and involves large delays caused by open-
ing and closing files each time for many files, as op-
posed to doing continuous I/Os on large files with large
workloads. From Figure 8(a)(b), we observe increased
throughput as the number of processes increases in all
three cases (MicronSSD, Key MicronSSD (Close), Key
MicronSSD (NoClose)). Comparing the results for Mi-
cronSSD and Key MicronSSD (Close), KEY-SSD (Key
MicronSSD) seems to have slightly lower throughput
than MicronSSD when I/O loads are high (referring to
32P or 64P). Since the OS kernel runs the read-verify
method on the KEY-SSD, it requires additional disk
block access for key authentication on the first page when
opening the file. When we compare the results for Key
MicronSSD (Close) and Key MicronSSD (NoClose), we
again see the performance difference between the two is
almost negligible, unlike the expectation that the key re-
trieval time will take longer for all key searches because
the keys are kept in the KEYINODE table without being
deleted.
For example, in Key MicronSSD (NoClose), I/O is
performed for 64,000 files in 64 processes. If the key
is not removed from the KEYINODE at the time of
file close, up to 64,000 entries may accumulate in the
KEYINODE, which may degrade table search perfor-
mance. However, in our experiment, the search time
overhead is too small to degrade the overall I/O perfor-
mance. Figure 8(c)(d) show the results for big files work-
loads. Unlike the results for small workloads, we see
there is very little performance difference between three.
This is because the additional disk access overhead of the
read-verify method is not noticeably large.
5.4 End-to-End Performance Analysis
In this experiment, we perform an end-to-end ex-
periment to analyze the overhead including the ker-
nel and KEY-FTL(S) implementation overhead. For
the Key OpenSSD, we deleted keys from KEYINODE
when closing. Figure 9 shows the performance com-
parison between OpenSSD and Key OpenSSD. Over-
all bandwidths were observed lower than those from
Micron experiments because overall read/write band-
widths of OpenSSD are lower than MicronSSD as in
Table 1. Comparing the performance of OpenSSD and
Key OpenSSD, we see little difference in performance
between them, which is slightly different from Figure 8.
In particular, in Figure 8, the kernel overhead caused by
the read-verify method is noticeable when I/O loads are
very high, but it is not shown here. This is because the
performance of the OpenSSD is so low that the overhead
of the read-verify method is hidden.
For another realistic end-to-end experiment, we have
modified the SQLite [25] source code and protected DB
files with a key. SQLite could pass a user-defined key
when accessing DB files using sys open key() and
sys close key() system call. Table 2 presents the re-
sults of comparing the performance of OpenSSD and
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Workload KeyOpenSSD OpenSSD
Insert 16.42 16.48
Intersection 880.80 892.23
Table 2: Performance comparison of OpenSSD and Key
OpenSSD for database application.
Key OpenSSD. Performance was measured using the
Database Benchmark Tool [3] in SQLite [25] with two
representative DB workloads. Insert workload is write
heavy and intersection workload is read heavy. For the
insert workload, we observe OpenSSD shows 16.48 TPS
(Transactions Per Second) while Key OpenSSD shows
16.42 TPS, which is little difference between them. For
the intersection workloads, we have similar observation.
5.5 Protection against Real Ransomware
In this experiment, we show KEY-SSD can protect
against attacks performed through the normal file I/O
path of the OS and by bypassing the OS directly from
the user application.
Normal file I/O path attack: To evaluate whether
KEY-SSD can prevent actual ransomware attacks, we
run an ransomware sample [33] on the SQLite DB file
(test.db) generated in the previous experiment. The ran-
somware sample works as follows. The ransomware first
reads test.db, the target file, and encrypts it with AES 256
encryption. Then, it creates a new file, infected.db and
write the encrypted data on it, and then deletes the origi-
nal db file, test.db. Ransomware opens test.db without a
key. When attempting to read data (test.db), ransomware
does not have a key, so the block request can not find the
correct key when referring to the KEYINODE in the ker-
nel block layer, and eventually the access is blocked at
the disk end.
Direct I/O attack: We formatted OpenSSD as EXT4
and created a 1M file with a key. We also used a fair-
lio benchmark to directly access the device and perform
I/O on the data blocks on the disk. Then, we write to
the 1MB file data locked by the key on the disk in 4 KB
units without the key, and write 24 KB sequentially. Fig-
ure 10 shows the host’s kernel log and OpenSSD’s device
log. Currently a 1M file is written beginning with LBA:
0x43000. Figure 10(a) shows the kernel and OpenSSD
device logs on the host for a 24 KB write request with-
out a key. Figure 10(b)(c) show the kernel and device’s
logs when attempting to write on the locked blocks with
the proper key. Figure 10(b) shows kernel logs, kernel
block layer and device driver send the 24 KB write re-
quests without keys. And Figure 10(b), Figure 10(c)
shows KEY-SSD blocks LBA’s requests on the blocks
from 43000 to 43028. Therefore, this experiment con-
firmed that KEY-SSD protects direct I/O access of unau-
thorized applications.
Attacks using page cache: There could be a ran-
somware attack that reads the file data in the page cache
and deletes the original file after creating a new file. As
mentioned in Section 4.4, KEY-SSD can prevent these
attacks through the read-verity method. We have exper-
imentally proved that this attack can be successfully de-
fended. However, owing to space constraints here, we do
not show results.
5.6 Security Analysis
In this section, we discuss the steps that ransomware typ-
ically performs and the effectiveness of Key-SSD, ex-
plaining how Key-SSD can defend against ransomware
attacks at each step. The steps are as follows: Infection
→ Persistence → Removing backup copies → Encryp-
tion→ Notice, illustrated in Table 3.
Infection: Ransomware is a type of malware that
exploits vulnerabilities to damage victim’s computers.
For example, CryptoLocker exploits vulnerabilities in
Internet Explorer and Adobe Flash to control the com-
puter [13]. The approach proposed in this study is that
the application provides the key. If the application is
compromised, the files of the compromised application
can be infected by the ransomware. However, its im-
pact is confined only to the compromised application. If
an application is compromised, its key is very likely to
be revealed. In this case, files belonging to the compro-
mised application can be encrypted by the ransomware.
However, since the revealed key is only for the compro-
mised application, ransomware cannot use the key to ac-
cess other files that belong to other applications. For ex-
ample, even if CryptoLocker compromises Internet Ex-
plorer, docx files and pptx files that belong to MS Word
and PowerPoint cannot be accessed by CryptoLocker.
Persistence: Ransomware can survive after rebooting.
It may also include a self-propagating mechanism that
infects other computers in the network. For example,
WannaCry propagates itself by exploiting vulnerability
of Window’s Server Message Block (SMB) protocol [8].
This persistence mechanism often modifies system files.
Therefore, if system files are protected by KEY-SSD, it
will be much harder for ransomware to modify system
files. For example, KEY-SSD can enforce system files to
be updated only by the legitimate updater.
Removing backup copies: Ransomware destroys
backup copies. This step is unique to ransomware com-
pared to other types of malware. If backup copies are
available, the victim can recover files without paying for
ransom. Thus, ransomware finds and destroys all backup
copies. Again, if backup copies are under the protec-
tion of KEY-SSD, ransomware will not be able to delete
them.
Encryption: Ransomware finds the data file and en-
crypts it with an encryption key. Before encrypting
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(a) Kernel log: inode num : 3407901, key: 0x2711, block write from lba: 0x43000
(c) Device log: Unauthorized accesses are blocked.(b) Kernel log: no_key_request2: request without key in block layer
                   no_key_ata_tf_to_fis: request without key in the SATA driver
Figure 10: Verification of protection by KEY-SSD for direct I/O ransomware attacks.
Step Infection Persistence RBC Encrypt
Malware Migration [35, 5] X
Renaming [44] X
App. Behavior
Monitor [36, 29, 45] X
Net. Behavior
Monitor [7, 2, 46] X
Crypto. Library [24, 26, 27] X
File Backup [48, 11] X
KEY-SSD X X X
Table 3: Step-by-step analysis from Infection to Encryp-
tion of ransomware attacks and comparison with existing
defense techniques and KEY-SSD. RBC denotes remov-
ing back copies.
data files, ransomware (e.g. CryptoLock) can exchange
encryption keys with a remote command and control
(C&C) server. If data files are under the protection
of KEY-SSD, ransomware cannot read and write (over-
write) the file unless the application of the file is com-
promised. Most (if not all) of the existing ransomware
mitigation techniques work at this step. They detect
ransomware by monitoring specific behaviors pertain-
ing to key exchanges and encryption. KEY-SSD pre-
vents ransomware not only at this step, but also previous
steps as explained above. It should be noted that several
prior works for malware mitigation techniques[35, 5] in-
vestigate the problems of detecting and preventing ran-
somware at the first two steps because ransomware is
also a kind of malware.
Notice: Eventually, ransomware informs the victim of
ransom payment. Once it is received, ransomware will
restore the hostage file and erase all forensic evidence.
6 Related Work
Since ransomware is a kind of malware, existing mal-
ware mitigation techniques can be used to detect and pre-
vent ransomware [35]. Ransomware exhibits specific be-
haviors such as searching target files, accessing crypto-
graphic libraries frequently, and exchanging encryption
keys with a remote command-and-control servers. There
are studies to prevent ransomware by detecting these
known behaviors [36, 29, 45, 7, 2, 46, 24, 26]. While
these techniques increase the difficulty of successful in-
fections, evolved ransomware can circumvent these tech-
niques [36].
Data backup is another category of mitigation tech-
niques for ransomware attacks [48]. ShieldFS is a
filesystem that automatically recovers files from backup
copies, when the files are infected by ransomware [11].
However, data backup requires extra storage, and intelli-
gent ransomware can erase backup copies [44, 13].
Mutual authentication techniques [16, 18] are often
used to protect disk drives. The disk grants access only
if the host is authenticated by the protocol. The host also
accesses the disk only if the disk is authenticated. The
mutual authentication techniques are not intended to pro-
tect individual files on the disk from malware. Authenti-
cation entities are disks, not individual files. KEY-SSD
Encryption [30, 34, 37, 9, 42, 47, 20, 39, 50, 49, 43]
is a popular technique for protecting data stored in disk
drives. The entire disk can be encrypted (full-disk en-
cryption), or files are encrypted selectively. Ransomware
can still read files even if they are encrypted. Ran-
somware cannot interpret the contents of the file, but can
re-encrypt the file with its own encryption key.
Trusted Computing Module (TPM) is often used with
authentication or encryption for key management [19].
This is because keys need to be stored in a safe place.
Since key management is orthogonal to our approach,
TPM can also be used to manage keys for KEY-SSD.
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper proposes a fundamental countermeasure to
ransomware attacks. KEY-SSD, a disk drive using an
access-control mechanism can be the last barrier of data
breach. Even if ransomware acquires an administra-
tive privilege and bypasses the access control mecha-
nism in the file system, it cannot avoid the disk-level ac-
cess control. To support disk-level access control, we
slightly modify the Linux kernel to transfer the keys to
access-control drives. Our extensive experimental results
demonstrate that the performance overhead for KEY-
SSD with KEY-FTL(S) is negligible and file data has
been successfully protected from attacks by real ran-
somware samples.
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